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There Is No Special Problem of
Mindreading in Nonhuman AnimalsMarta Halina*yThere is currently a consensus among comparative psychologists that nonhuman ani-
mals are capable of some forms of mindreading. Several philosophers and psycholo-
gists have criticized this consensus, however, arguing that there is a “logical problem”
with the experimental approach used to test for mindreading in nonhuman animals. I
argue that the logical problem is no more than a version of the general skeptical problem
known as the theoretician’s dilemma. As such, it is not a problem that comparative
psychologists must solve before providing evidence for mindreading.
1. Introduction. Adult humans use information about the cognitive states
of other agents to predict and explain behavior. This ability is known as
“mindreading.”1 Over 30 years ago, Premack and Woodruff (1978) posed
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University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RH, UK; e-mail: mh801
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yThis paper was presented to the Philosophy of Science Research Group at Washington
University in St. Louis, Missouri. I thank the members of that group for their helpful com
ments and discussion. I also thank William Bechtel, Nancy Cartwright, and C. Kenneth Wa
ters for discussions that led to the development of the main ideas presented here, Carl Crave
for detailed comments on the penultimate draft, and three anonymous reviewers for thei
careful and constructive feedback.
The title of this paper is inspired by Callender and Cohen’s article “There Is No Specia
Problem about Scientiﬁc Representation” (2006). Callender and Cohen argue that the prob
lems of scientiﬁc representation are just the problems of representation in general and thus
that the proposed solutions for the latter can be applied to the former. Similarly, I argue tha
the problems involved in establishing the claim that nonhuman animals mindread are no
different from the problems involved in establishing any theoretical claim in science. Thus
the proposed solutions to the latter can be applied to the former.
1. I follow Nichols and Stich ð2003Þ in preferring this term over others, such as “theory
of mind,” as it is more theoretically neutral.
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the question, do chimpanzees mindread? Since then, comparative psychol-
ogists have conducted numerous experiments aimed at addressing this ques-
474 MARTA HALINAtion. Recently, they have proposed an answer: chimpanzees mindread with
respect to some psychological states, such as intentions and perceptions (Call
and Tomasello 2008).
Over the past few years, the claim that chimpanzees mindread has been
heavily criticized by a group of psychologists and philosophers led by Dan-
iel Povinelli (Povinelli and Vonk 2003, 2004; Vonk and Povinelli 2006; Penn
and Povinelli 2007, 2009, 2013; Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli 2008; Penn
2011). These skeptics argue that the experimental approach currently used
in comparative psychology to test for mindreading in nonhuman animals
cannot provide evidence for this ability even in principle. The problem, they
argue, is that this approach is incapable of rejecting the hypothesis that non-
human animals solve mindreading tasks on the basis of reasoning about
observable regularities alone. It is not until this alternative hypothesis is
rejected that comparative psychologists are justiﬁed in claiming that they
have evidence for mindreading. This criticism has been dubbed the “logical
problem” because it points to a ﬂaw in the logic of the current experimental
approach (Hurley and Nudds 2006; Lurz 2011). Given the logical problem,
the skeptics maintain that we cannot accept any of the positive evidence for
animal mindreading that has been produced thus far.
In this article I defend the position of comparative psychologists against
this criticism.2 I begin in section 2 by showing that mindreading skeptics
are in agreement with comparative psychologists concerning the deﬁnition
of mindreading. According to both camps, mindreading is the ability to
classify disparate behaviors into abstract equivalence classes according to
the cognitive state that they have in common. I then show how comparative
psychologists employ what John Stuart Mill identiﬁed as the methods of
agreement and difference in order to determine whether nonhuman animals
have this ability. In the 1990s, most comparative psychologists held that
chimpanzees were incapable of mindreading because they did not meet
the evidential criteria accepted in the ﬁeld. However, chimpanzees were
subsequently found to meet these criteria, which is the basis for the current
consensus. I brieﬂy present this shift in the ﬁeld in order to illustrate the ap-
plication of Mill’s methods and to distinguish the early opposition to animal
mindreading from the current opposition, which is framed in terms of the
logical problem.
In section 3 I introduce the logical problem and show how, unlike the
early opposition to chimpanzee mindreading, it rejects the methods and
evidential criteria currently used in comparative psychology. In section 4 I
2. For other arguments against the position of mindreading skeptics see Andrews
(2012), Fletcher and Carruthers (2013), Andrews and Huss (2014), and Buckner (2014).
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present my objections to this new oppositional approach. I argue that the
logical problem is a version of the general skeptical problem known as the
MINDREADING IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS 475theoretician’s dilemma. As such, it is not a special problem facing those in-
vestigating nonhuman animal mindreading, but rather a feature of all the-
oretical claims. I consider two objections to my argument: ﬁrst, that it ren-
ders mindreading empirically intractable, and second, that it misconstrues
the logical problem. I argue that both of these objections fail to restore the
logical problem to its current position as a problem that undermines con-
temporary research on mindreading in nonhuman animals. I conclude that
the logical problem is not a problem that comparative psychologists must
solve before making claims about mindreading. Thus, mindreading skep-
tics are not justiﬁed in dismissing the experimental methods currently used
in comparative psychology or the positive evidence for animal mindreading
that these methods have produced.3
2. Identifying Mindreading in Nonhuman Animals
2.1. What Is Mindreading? Penn and Povinelli (2007) present a min-
imal deﬁnition of mindreading that captures the core of the concept well.
In their view, mindreading is the ability to produce and use ms variables,
where an ms variable carries information about the cognitive state of an-
other organism.4 Since one organism cannot directly observe the cognitive
state of another organism, mind readers must produce ms variables on the
basis of observable information. That is, they must implement some func-
tion that allows them to calculate ms variables on the basis of observable
input. How do we determine whether an agent is producing an ms variable?
Penn and Povinelli urge, “Let us agree that an ms variable carries informa-
tion about some other cognitive state if the state of the ms variable covaries
with the state of the other cognitive state in a generally reliable manner such
that, ceteris paribus, variation in the ms variable can be used by the con-
suming cognitive system to infer corresponding variations in the cognitive3. Two notes concerning the scope of this paper are important to emphasize. First, I
focus on the mindreading claim that chimpanzees know what objects another agent can
or cannot see, given that agent’s point of view (what psychologists refer to as “level 1
visual perspective taking”). However, I take my argument against the logical problem to
apply to all domains of mindreading research. Second, I do not hold that the logical
problem exhausts all arguments against mindreading in nonhuman animals. There are
alternative routes that mindreading skeptics could take in formulating their critique,
several of which I outline in sec. 4 (see also n. 6). The purpose of this paper is instead to
show that one common strategy for arguing against animal mindreading is unsuccessful.
4. Penn and Povinelli (2007) do not state whether the letters “ms” stand for “mental
state” or “mindreading state.” I prefer the term “mindreading state” because it is not as
easily conﬂated with “cognitive state.”
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state” (2007, 733). A mind reader, then, uses information that is a function
of another organism’s cognitive state (ms = f (cs)).
476 MARTA HALINA2.2. How Do Comparative Psychologists Test for Mindreading? The
deﬁnition of mindreading endorsed by skeptics such as Povinelli and col-
leagues concurs with the approach that comparative psychologists cur-
rently take to determine the mindreading abilities of nonhuman animals.
Psychologists test for mindreading abilities by using Mill’s methods of
agreement and difference (Mill 1872/2006, 388–96). Mill proposed these
methods as a way of establishing a regularity or correlation between two
phenomena.5 Suppose that we would like to determine whether there is a
regularity between x and y, where x temporally precedes y. The method of
difference does this by varying x while keeping the context in which x
occurs constant. If the presence of x consistently leads to y, while its ab-
sence consistently does not, then we have evidence that x and y covary. The
method of agreement, on the other hand, tests whether there is a relation-
ship between x and y by varying the contexts in which x occurs and seeing
whether this has an effect on the occurrence of y. If the situations leading
to y are such that they have nothing in common but x, then we have reason
to believe that it was precisely the presence of x that led to the occurrence
of y.
Comparative psychologists employ these methods in order to determine
whether nonhuman animals are sensitive to the cognitive states of other
agents. For example, they use them to test whether chimpanzees engage in
level 1 visual perspective taking or have the ability to know whether an
agent can or cannot see a particular object. Employing the deﬁnition of
mindreading introduced above, the question here is whether chimpanzees
produce and use an ms variable that reliably covaries with an agent’s visual
state of seeing an object.6 To address this question, psychologists apply the
method of difference by varying the visual state of some agent (cs) while
keeping the background variables (s) constant and examining whether chim-
panzees differentially respond to these changes in cs.7 In psychological5. Mill maintained that the method of agreement could only establish an invariable law
between two phenomena, while the method of difference could further establish a causal
law between phenomena (1872/2006, 394). Given our deﬁnition of mindreading, how-
ever, we need not worry about establishing causal relationships, so I will discuss these
methods in terms of demonstrating that two phenomena correlate reliably.
6. Researchers pursue simultaneously the question whether subjects are sensitive to an
agent’s visual state of not seeing an object.
7. Researchers cannot, of course, directly observe ms since it is an informational state
instantiated in an organism. Because of this, they rely on behaviors that are taken to be
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experiments such as these, researchers cannot hold all of the background
variables constant. That is, they cannot alter the visual state of an agent
MINDREADING IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS 477without changing some feature of the observable world (such as the orien-
tation of the agent’s head, the location of the seen/unseen object, the opac-
ity of a barrier, etc.). Thus, one might worry that these variations in s are
leading to differences in ms, rather than the variations in cs. In order to con-
trol for this possibility, researchers turn to the method of agreement.
Psychologists apply the method of agreement by varying the background
variables associated with cs, while keeping cs constant. In the case of vi-
sual perspective taking experiments, this involves employing a variety of
techniques for changing the visual state of an agent. An agent might see
an object because her eyes are oriented toward it, there is no barrier be-
tween her eyes and the object, the barrier between her eyes and the object is
transparent, and so on. By showing that a subject is sensitive to cs across a
wide range of observable situations, one demonstrates that the subject’s ms
variable is a function of cs, rather than a particular s.
In summary, researchers test for mindreading by applying Mill’s meth-
ods of difference and agreement. We can present the application of these
methods in the form of two mindreading criteria:
1. cs and ms covary;
2. cs is the only variable that is common to all situations leading to ms.
These two criteria pick out mindreading as deﬁned by Penn and Povinelli
above. They also pick out mindreading as characterized by Andrew Whiten
(1993, 1996, 1998). For Whiten, a mind reader is an individual who clas-
siﬁes disparate behaviors into the same class on the basis of the unobserv-
able cognitive state that they have in common (what is referred to as an
“intervening variable”). Under this view, a mind reader with respect to
perceptual states should classify all seeing agents together (and non-seeing
agents together) even when these agents have no observable features in
common. Penn and Povinelli take their deﬁnition of mindreading to be
consistent with Whiten’s account. They write that “being able to recode
perceptually disparate behavioural patterns resulting from the same under-
lying cognitive state as instances of the same abstract equivalence class is
a bona ﬁde example of postulating an ms variable in the sense deﬁned
hereinabove” (2007, 733). Through the application of Mill’s methods, com-
reliable indicators of ms. For example, common indicators of the ms variable “I know
that you see” include the production of visual gestures in contexts involving cooperative
food-bearing agents and the avoidance of food in contexts involving dominant com-
petitors.
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parative psychologists test whether an individual is grouping observable
situations in this way.8
478 MARTA HALINA2.3. Visual Perspective Taking in Great Apes: The Shift in Consensus.
In the 1990s, many comparative psychologists agreed that chimpanzees
were not capable of attributing perceptual states to others. Early experi-
ments by Povinelli and colleagues played an important role in establish-
ing this consensus. Most importantly, Povinelli and Eddy (1996) conducted
a series of experiments that showed that chimpanzees failed to meet the
two criteria for mindreading speciﬁed above. They found that chimpan-
zee subjects were generally insensitive to the difference between an ex-
perimenter who could see them and one who could not, thus failing to meet
the ﬁrst criterion. They also found that, in those cases when subjects ap-
peared to be sensitive to the presence and absence of cs, there was an ob-
servable cue that accompanied cs, and the pattern of performance exhib-
ited by subjects suggested that they were responding to this cue rather than
to cs. Thus, subjects also failed to meet the second criterion for mindread-
ing. Povinelli and Eddy draw two main conclusions from their studies:
“appropriate experimental designs, coupled with sufﬁciently large sample
sizes, can provide a very sensitive analysis of what nonhuman primates
know about the mind” (140), and “collectively, our ﬁndings provide little
evidence that young chimpanzees understand seeing as a mental state” (vi).
Throughout the 1990s, most comparative psychologists agreed (Call, Hare,
and Tomasello 1998; Tomasello, Hare, and Agnetta 1999).
This consensus shifted at the turn of the century, however. As research-
ers conducted more mindreading experiments, they found that chimpan-
zees did in fact meet the two criteria for mindreading with respect to per-
ceptual states (Tomasello, Call, and Hare 2003; Tomasello and Call 2006;
Call and Tomasello 2008). For example, they found that chimpanzees treat
an agent as “seeing an object x” when that agent directs her gaze at x, has
8. It is worth noting that the deﬁnition of mindreading advanced by Whiten and by Penn
and Povinelli is relatively minimal and thus will not satisfy some mindreading theorists.
For example, mindreading in this sense requires only what Josef Perner identiﬁes as
secondary representation (the ability to reason about hypothetical situations), not meta-
representation (the ability to represent something as a representation). Thus, those who
maintain that the term “mindreading” should be reserved for metarepresentational
abilities will not be satisﬁed with the way that it is employed here (see Perner 1991; Call
2001; Whiten and Suddendorf 2001). Others might ﬁnd this characterization of mind-
reading unsatisfying insofar as it presumes a clear divide between reasoning about
mental states and behavior (see Gallagher’s position in Gallagher and Povinelli 2012).
The purpose of this paper, however, is not to argue for a particular deﬁnition of mind-
reading, but rather to show that there is no problem providing evidence for mindreading
according to the deﬁnition accepted by mindreading skeptics such as Povinelli and
colleagues.
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looked at x in the past, or could potentially be looking at x (Hare et al.
2000; Hare, Call, and Tomasello 2001; Hare and Tomasello 2006; Melis,
MINDREADING IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS 479Call, and Tomasello 2006; Kaminski, Call, and Tomasello 2008). A similar
result was found for the cognitive state of not seeing: chimpanzees treat an
agent as “not seeing an object x” when that agent is facing away from x,
facing x with closed eyes, facing x with open eyes but with an opaque bar-
rier between the agent and x, and so on (Hare et al. 2000, 2001; Hostetter,
Cantero, and Hopkins 2001; Hostetter et al. 2007; Leavens, Russell, and
Hopkins 2010). Moreover, many of these experiments were speciﬁcally
designed in order to control for observable cues that typically co-occur with
the cognitive states of seeing and not seeing, such as an agent’s head ori-
entation or looking behavior. For example, Hare et al. (2001) controlled for
the observable cue of an agent orienting toward an object in the recent past,
and Kaminski et al. (2008) further controlled for the observable cue of an
agent orienting toward a piece of food in its most recent location. Melis et al.
(2006) controlled for all looking behavior by requiring that subjects rea-
son about an agent’s potential ability to see something, rather than their ac-
tual perceptual states. The observable situations in the above experiments
were all various (whether or not an object was moved, whether a subject
chose ﬁrst or second in a turn-taking game, whether a tunnel was transpar-
ent or opaque), yet subjects treated them as belonging to the same abstract
equivalence class based on the cognitive state that they had in common.
In the context of experiments such as those above, the ﬁndings of Po-
vinelli and Eddy seemed anomalous, and researchers wondered whether
some aspect of their experiment might have unintentionally impeded the
performance of their subjects. Thus, Kaminski, Call, and Tomasello (2004)
conducted a study with conditions similar to those examined by Povinelli
and Eddy, but with improved methods.9 This new study found that chim-
panzees were more sensitive to states of seeing and not seeing than found
in the original study. Other experiments conﬁrmed this ﬁnding (Hostetter
et al. 2001, 2007; Leavens et al. 2004, 2010; Liebal et al. 2004; Poss et al.
2006; Bräuer, Call, and Tomasello 2007; Hopkins, Taglialatela, and Leavens
2007; Tempelmann, Kaminski, and Liebal 2011).
In this way, the majority of comparative psychologists have gone from
holding that apes do not understand perceptual states to thinking that they
9. In Povinelli and Eddy’s study, subjects were faced with the task of choosing to beg
for food from one of two experimenters. This is not a predicament that chimpanzees
usually face, and they had to be trained for hundreds of trials in order to learn that they
had to choose between the two experimenters. Thus, Kaminski et al. (2004) designed
a study similar to that of Povinelli and Eddy’s, except that subjects faced only one
experimenter during a trial and their gesturing behavior was compared across trials.
Using this approach, the researchers did not need to train the subjects to participate in the
experiment.
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do (for reviews, see Tomasello and Call 2006; Call and Tomasello 2008).
Whereas in the early stages of mindreading research chimpanzees appeared
480 MARTA HALINAto fail the two criteria for mindreading, this changed as an increasingly
large number of studies showed that they were in fact capable of making the
appropriate discriminations in a wide range of contexts. Of course, as To-
masello and Call write, “science is open-ended, and the case is certainly not
closed on the issue of whether chimpanzees understand seeing” (2006,
382), but for comparative psychologists the evidence currently favors the
hypothesis that they do.
3. TheLogical Problem. Povinelli and colleagues’ early opposition to non-
human animal mindreading ﬁt within the traditional experimental meth-
ods and evidential criteria employed in comparative psychology. However,
the current criticism of mindreading (the logical problem) departs dramat-
ically from this tradition. This criticism maintains that the above experi-
mental approach cannot provide evidence for or against a mindreading hy-
pothesis even in principle (Povinelli and Vonk 2004; Penn and Povinelli
2007).
Proponents of the logical problem maintain that, under the current ex-
perimental approach taken by comparative psychologists, there is a com-
plementary behavior-reading (CBR) hypothesis for every mindreading hy-
pothesis. As we have seen, a mindreading hypothesis posits that subjects
perform successfully on mindreading experiments because they are capa-
ble of predicting an agent’s behavior on the basis of information about that
agent’s cognitive state. For example, a subject might reason, “dominant
competitors tend to retrieve food that they can see; this competitor can see the
food (cs), so she will retrieve it (b).” A CBR hypothesis, in contrast, posits
that subjects perform successfully on mindreading experiments because
they are capable of predicting an individual’s behavior on the basis of ob-
servable regularities alone. In such a case, a subject might reason, “domi-
nant competitors tend to retrieve food that is in their direct line of gaze;
this food is in the competitor’s direct line of gaze (s), so she will retrieve
it (b).”
Proponents of the logical problem urge that the current experimental ap-
proach used to test for mindreading in nonhuman animals is incapable
of distinguishing between mindreading and CBR hypotheses. In order to
mindread, an agent requires knowledge of the regularity that some situa-
tion s will lead an agent to have the cognitive state cs, which will in turn
lead that agent to produce a particular behavior b (s à cs à b). But if
subjects have knowledge of this regularity, they also have knowledge of
the regularity that the observable situation s will lead an agent to produce
a particular behavior b (s à b). Why posit the additional inferential step
involving cs? According to proponents of the logical problem, current mind-This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Mon, 2 Nov 2015 12:12:29 PM
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reading experiments give us no reason to do so. As Penn and Povinelli
write, “in order to produce experimental evidence for an fToM [theory of
MINDREADING IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS 481mind function] one must ﬁrst falsify the null hypothesis that the agents in
question are simply using their normal, ﬁrst-person cognitive state vari-
ables” (2007, 734). However, no mindreading experiment conducted thus
far has succeeded in rejecting this null hypothesis. It is not until the CBR
hypothesis is rejected that researchers will have provided “compelling evi-
dence for the cognitive (i.e., causal) necessity of an fToM in addition to and
distinct from the cognitive work that could have been performed without
such a function” (734).
The logical problem maintains that the logic of the current experimen-
tal approach fails to reject the hypothesis that subjects solve apparent mind-
reading tasks on the basis of observable regularities alone. The idea that one
must reject the CBR hypothesis before having evidence for mindreading
motivates the general strategy employed by skeptics for undermining what
comparative psychologists take as evidence for mindreading in nonhuman
animals. This strategy runs as follows:
1. Identify those experiments that seem to provide evidence that non-
human animals mindread.
2. For each experiment identiﬁed in step 1, show that the regularity sà
b can replace the regularity s à cs à b.
3. On the basis of step 2, maintain that subjects could have solved the
experimental task on the basis of having knowledge of sà b, rather
than knowledge of s à cs à b.
4. On the basis of step 3, conclude that one cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that subjects solved the experimental task using their knowl-
edge of sà b.
5. Conclude that there is no evidence that nonhuman animals mind-
read.
Before presenting my critique of this strategy, there are three things that
are important to note. First, in employing this strategy, skeptics are not chal-
lenging the claim that nonhuman animals meet the ﬁrst mindreading cri-
terion (that cs and ms covary). Penn and Povinelli (2009) agree that non-
human animals such as apes often behave exactly as if they have knowledge
of certain cognitive states. In fact, they go so far as to state that with regard
to the early competition studies of Hare and colleagues (Hare et al. 2000,
2001), “there has never been any dispute about the fact that chimpanzees
act as if they understand that others can see things” (Penn and Povinelli 2009,
17). However, when psychologists say that there is evidence that chim-
panzees produce and employ an ms variable, they mean nothing more than
that there is behavioral evidence that this is the case. Thus, both partiesThis content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Mon, 2 Nov 2015 12:12:29 PM
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agree that chimpanzees behave as if they produce and use an ms variable
that covaries with the perceptual states of other agents.
482 MARTA HALINASecond, the skeptics are not challenging the claim that nonhuman ani-
mals meet the second mindreading criterion (that cs is the only variable
common to the situations leading to ms). When showing how one can ap-
peal to some regularity sà b, mindreading skeptics rarely try to show that
the s in each experiment is the same. The antecedent variables can be var-
ious, and the regularities can be abstract and complex. Indeed, Povinelli and
colleagues argue that given what is known about nonhuman primate be-
havior in experimental and naturalistic settings, we have reason to think that
these regularities will be abstract and complex (Povinelli and Vonk 2004;
Penn and Povinelli 2013).
Third, in employing the above strategy, mindreading skeptics do not
attempt to show that it is ontogenetically or phylogenetically more plausible
that subjects are employing sà b over sà csà b. Instead, they observe
that if an individual has knowledge of sà csà b, then that individual also
has knowledge of s à b. Thus, the claim that a subject has somehow ac-
quired s à b is no less empirically plausible than the claim that this sub-
ject has somehow acquired sà csà b. As Povinelli and Vonk write, “the
problem we face is not primarily an empirical one. Instead, the most press-
ing problem is to come to grips with the fact that the experimental results
from the kinds of techniques that are currently in vogue cannot add a sin-
gle bit of evidence in unique support of the conclusion that chimpanzees
reason about mental states—any mental states” (2004, 11; emphasis in the
original).10
Some mindreading skeptics might deny the above characterization of
the logical problem by denying one or more of the three points above. That
is, they could argue that (1) the logical problem is in fact the claim that
nonhuman animals fail to meet one or both of the mindreading criteria or
(2) the CBR hypothesis is actually a competing empirical hypothesis, rather
than a null hypothesis. I discuss these options in the following section, ar-
guing that although they allow one to avoid the criticism that the logical
problem is a general skeptical problem, they transform the problem into one
10. It is worth noting that Povinelli and colleagues do provide an evolutionary account
aimed at motivating the claim that nonhuman animals are incapable of mindreading.
Their “reinterpretation hypothesis” posits that nonhuman primates have adapted to the
observable regularities that result from cognitive agents interacting with the world, but
that only humans evolved the additional ability to reinterpret these observable regu-
larities in terms of the unobservable cognitive states underlying them (Povinelli and Vonk
2003; Vonk and Povinelli 2006). However, this evolutionary account is not aimed at
making the CBR hypothesis more plausible than the mindreading hypothesis; instead, it
is aimed at motivating the possibility that nonhuman animals behave like mind readers
while lacking mindreading abilities.
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that is ineffective at undermining the experimental approach currently used
in comparative psychology.
MINDREADING IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS 4834. Why the Logical Problem Is Not a Special Problem. In this section I
argue that the logical problem is a version of what Hempel identiﬁed as the
theoretician’s dilemma. As such, it is not a special problem facing compar-
ative psychologists that can be solved through the design of better experi-
ments. I then consider two objections to this argument: ﬁrst, that it renders
mindreading empirically intractable, and second, that it mischaracterizes
the CBR hypothesis. Both of these objections, I argue, fail to restore the
logical problem to its original status as a problem that undermines current
mindreading research.
The fact that the logical problem (as characterized in the previous sec-
tion) is not solvable can be seen when one takes seriously the claim that
mindreading is not an act of telepathy. Given that mind readers are not
telepathic, any individual capable of mindreading must do so on the basis
of inferring cs from some observable state of affairs (s). Moreover, an ac-
curate mind reader will infer cs on the basis of those observable situations
that actually lead to cs. In the case of visual perspective taking, for example,
an accurate mind reader will infer that another agent can see x in those
situations in which the agent can actually see x (such as situations in which
the agent’s eyes are open, there is no opaque barrier between the agent and
x, etc.). Of course, one will not have knowledge of all of the observable
situations that lead to cs. Instead, a mind reader will only be able to infer cs
on the basis of the knowledge that he has uniquely acquired over evolu-
tionary and developmental time. That is, an individual can only infer cs on
the basis of some subset of s, a subset that reﬂects the organism’s innate and
acquired knowledge of those situations that lead to cs. Thus, within a given
experiment, the ms of an organism is not a function of cs or s, but rather
some subset of s that the organism knows reliably leads to cs. If this were
not the case, then mind readers would either have to infer cs without any
grounds for doing so or have to infer cs directly (that is, telepathically).
Given the above, one can always show that a subject is solving a par-
ticular mindreading task on the basis of observable regularities alone. In
order for subjects to perform successfully on a mindreading task, they must
know that s à cs because without such knowledge they would have no
reason to infer cs on the basis of the experimental situation. However, they
must also know that cs à b. Without this knowledge, subjects would be
unable to make the behavioral predictions necessary to demonstrate their
understanding of another agent’s cognitive state. Both of these elements
are required in order to get any mindreading experiment off the ground.
However, if subjects know sà cs and csà b, then they know that sà cs
à b. And if they know this, then they also know that sà b. Thus, the min-This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Mon, 2 Nov 2015 12:12:29 PM
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imal knowledge required to solve a mindreading task is all that is needed
in order to make the case that an individual solved that task using CBR in-
484 MARTA HALINAstead. If one has positive results for mindreading, one has also failed to reject
the CBR hypothesis.
The idea that one can replace a regularity involving theoretical terms with
a regularity devoid of such terms is what Hempel identiﬁed as the “theore-
tician’s dilemma.” As Hempel writes, “if the terms of and the general prin-
ciples of a scientiﬁc theory serve their purpose, i.e., if they establish deﬁ-
nite connections among observable phenomena, then they can be dispensed
with since any chain of laws and interpretative statements establishing such
a connection should then be replaceable by a law which directly links ob-
servational antecedents to observational consequents” (1958, 49). In other
words, if one uses theoretical terms to successfully establish a regularity
among observable phenomena, then one can remove those theoretical terms
from one’s account and describe the regularity in terms of observable phe-
nomena alone. Similarly, we can identify a mind reader’s dilemma:
If an individual is capable of mindreading, i.e., if she establishes deﬁnite
connections among observable phenomena, then her mindreading abilities
can be dispensed with since any evolved or learned rule establishing such a
connection should then be replaceable by a rule that directly links observa-
tional antecedents to observational consequents.
The logical problem simply is the mind reader’s dilemma. Given this, any
experiment aimed at testing mindreading will fail to reject the hypothesis
that subjects are reasoning in terms of observable regularities alone.
To be clear, the mind reader’s dilemma is a modiﬁed version of the the-
oretician’s dilemma—one that takes the mind reader to be the theoretician.
It is important to recognize the difference between these two dilemmas. The
theoretician’s dilemma is a claim about the theoretical terms posited by
researchers. If the logical problem were an unmodiﬁed version of the theo-
retician’s dilemma, then this would suggest that mindreading skeptics are
skeptical of the use of theoretical concepts to explain nonhuman animal be-
havior. Such skepticism would be akin to behaviorism, requiring that re-
searchers reformulate hypotheses of animal behavior in terms of observable
variables alone. Crucially, this is not the mindreading skeptics’ position.
They are not skeptical of the theoretical concepts employed by comparative
psychologists, but rather those employed by nonhuman animal subjects.
The mind reader’s dilemma captures this skepticism, holding that it is
always possible to replace the theoretical concepts employed by mind read-
ers with observable variables. Such a move transforms a mindreading hy-
pothesis into a behavior-reading one. However, the behavior-reading hy-
pothesis itself still contains theoretical terms. It posits, for example, thatThis content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Mon, 2 Nov 2015 12:12:29 PM
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nonhuman animal subjects have certain cognitive abilities, such as the ability
to form memories and abstract behavioral rules. It simply denies that non-
MINDREADING IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS 485human animals reason about the unobservable mental states of other agents.
In the literature, mindreading skeptics present the logical problem as a
methodological problem that is solvable. They argue that it is not the in-
vestigation of mindreading that is problematic, but rather the experimental
approach that comparative psychologists have used to investigate it thus far.
This experimental approach, they argue, needs to be replaced with a new
methodology, one capable of rejecting the CBR hypothesis. Several such
new methodologies have been proposed (see Heyes 1998; Povinelli and
Vonk 2004; Penn and Povinelli 2007; Lurz 2011; Lurz and Krachun 2011).
However, none of these have provided a compelling solution to the logical
problem (Andrews 2005; Lurz 2009, 2011; Buckner 2014). The fact that
such a solution has not been forthcoming makes sense in light of the mind
reader’s dilemma. Given this dilemma, we should not expect to be able to
reject the CBR hypothesis on the basis of the results of an individual ex-
periment, no matter how well it is designed.
Does the fact that the logical problem is a general skeptical problem
render mindreading empirically intractable? Crucially, it does not. Instead,
it requires that one take a different approach to the problem. For any ex-
periment considered in isolation, ms will covary with some observable state
of affairs. Thus, for any individual experiment, there is no way to determine
whether subjects are responding to cs or the corresponding observable state.
Comparative psychologists, however, can get around the mind reader’s di-
lemma by applying Mill’s method of agreement to a collection of experi-
ments. Doing so provides evidence for mindreading insofar as it establishes
that subjects are responding to a diverse set of observable variables (eyes
closed, opaque barrier present, head turned) as belonging to the same ab-
stract equivalence class (situations that lead to a state of not seeing). It is the
sensitivity to the existence of this class of behaviors that shows that subjects
are reasoning in a way that goes beyond reasoning about observable vari-
ables alone.
The above is an instance of causal reasoning that is used widely in the
sciences. Mill’s methods are generally used to identify the likely cause of
an event from a set of possibilities. Discovering that there is one variable
common to all situations leading to an effect gives us reason to believe that
it is this variable that is causally related to that effect. In the case of mind-
reading, researchers need not go so far as to establish that cs causes ms; it is
enough to show that cs and ms covary in a reliable manner (see sec. 2.1).
Positing that chimpanzees are reasoning about unobservable mental states is
justiﬁed, then, insofar as this variable leads to the same effect across a wide
range of observable conditions. Experiments on visual perspective taking in
chimpanzees have demonstrated precisely this.This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Mon, 2 Nov 2015 12:12:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
One could attempt to apply something like the logical problem to a col-
lection of experiments. That is, one could argue that in order to have evi-
486 MARTA HALINAdence for mindreading, one must show that it is plausible that subjects are
classifying situations together on the basis of the underlying cognitive state
that they have in common and not on the basis of some observable cue that
they have in common. Lurz (2011), for example, argues that one can ac-
count for many of the results of visual perspective taking experiments by
positing that subjects reason in terms of a “direct line of gaze” rather than
the mental state of seeing. I agree that if mindreading skeptics could show
that there were some observable cue common to all mindreading experi-
ments aimed at testing a subject’s knowledge of a particular cognitive state,
then this would indeed undermine the claim that these experiments provide
evidence for mindreading. However, comparative psychologists are well
aware of this and control for it by applying the method of agreement (as
discussed in sec. 2.3). It is precisely because there is no such cue common to
all situations involving cs that researchers hold that there is evidence for
mindreading. The logical problem in this guise does not undermine the cur-
rent experimental approach. Thus, if mindreading skeptics take this to be the
logical problem, they cannot also maintain, as they currently do, that the
current experimental approach cannot provide evidence for mindreading
even in principle.
A second objection to the above argument is that it mischaracterizes the
nature of the CBR hypothesis. Mindreading skeptics might concede that,
understood as a null hypothesis, the CBR hypothesis cannot be rejected be-
cause one can always reinterpret mindreading as the ability to reason about
observable regularities. However, the CBR hypothesis is not a null hypoth-
esis, but rather a positive empirical claim with its own evidential support
and epistemic virtues. The logical problem is really the problem that the
mindreading and CBR hypotheses are equivalent in their theoretical plau-
sibility and evidential support.
There are two responses to this objection. First, the CBR hypothesis does
not have the features of an empirical hypothesis and is generally not ad-
vanced by skeptics as such. As discussed in section 3, skeptics do little to
motivate the CBR hypothesis empirically. More importantly, however, the
CBR hypothesis lacks the content necessary to make new predictions. As
Fletcher and Carruthers point out, “the behavior-rule account is only ca-
pable of ‘predicting’ new ﬁndings after they are discovered, postulating a
novel behavior-rule for the purpose” (2013, 8). Mindreading skeptics have
yet to provide a positive account concerning what behavior-reading skills
we should expect particular nonhuman animals to possess independently
of their performance on mindreading tasks. Instead, the behavior-reading
skills proposed are all and only those that can account for the current results
of mindreading research.This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Mon, 2 Nov 2015 12:12:29 PM
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Second, if the CBR hypothesis were an empirical hypothesis, then it
would not give rise to a logical problem. If mindreading skeptics were to
MINDREADING IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS 487begin motivating the CBR hypothesis on grounds other than those provided
by the results of mindreading experiments, we could begin discerning the
differences between these two hypotheses. We could assess the relative vir-
tues of the accounts based on, for example, their ability to account for the
empirical data, coherence with other theories, neurobiological plausibility,
and so on. If this were the case, though, mindreading skeptics could no
longer follow the general strategy (outlined in sec. 3) that they currently use
to undermine the positive results of mindreading experiments. Simply
showing that one can account for the successful performance of subjects on
a given mindreading task by positing that they employ the relevant s à b
rules would not undermine these results or their interpretation. If the CBR
hypothesis were a null hypothesis, then such a move would indeed show that
these experiments fail to provide evidence for mindreading. As an empiri-
cal hypothesis, however, this strategy does no more than illustrate the un-
derdetermination of theories by evidence. What is needed is an account of
what exactly the CBR hypothesis claims about the biological, psychologi-
cal, and behavioral capacities of apes and why these claims are theoretically
and empirically more plausible than positing that apes mindread. Without
such an account, the CBR hypothesis is not one that we can evaluate as a
serious alternative to mindreading.
Hempel rejects the theoretician’s dilemma, arguing that just because one
can get rid of the theoretical terms in an explanation does not mean that one
should. Instead, he maintains that researchers must take others things into
account, such as whether the presence or absence of the theoretical terms
leads to progress, given one’s epistemic goals. I suggest that we reject the
mind reader’s dilemma on similar grounds. The fact that we can account for
chimpanzee social behavior without positing mindreading abilities does not
mean that we should. Instead, we must evaluate both the mindreading and
CBR hypotheses in light of their success relative to the epistemic goals val-
ued by researchers. Currently, such an evaluation favors the mindreading
hypothesis. The logical problem poses no threat to this claim.
5. Conclusion. Comparative psychologists test for mindreading in non-
human animals by determining whether they detect the presence and ab-
sence of particular cognitive states in a wide variety of circumstances. They
eliminate potential confounding variables by ensuring that there is no one
observable state to which subjects might be responding. In the 1990s, Po-
vinelli and colleagues agreed with this methodological approach. Indeed,
they advocated it. However, over the past decade, they and other skeptics
have argued that animals might be solving mindreading tasks on the ba-
sis of knowledge of observable regularities alone; thus, most of the mind-This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Mon, 2 Nov 2015 12:12:29 PM
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reading research conducted to date must be dismissed as methodologically
ﬂawed. I have argued that this new oppositional strategy is mistaken. In the
488 MARTA HALINAsame way that one can reinterpret a successful theory in terms of regulari-
ties among observables, one can always reinterpret a successful mind reader
as a complementary behavior reader.
Penn and Povinelli (2013) object that they are sometimes accused of
“derived behaviorism” and that this accusation depends on a straw man of
their account, one that casts them as holding that nonhuman animals have
no representational abilities or are purely Pavlovian learners. I agree that
this is not their position. However, the arguments that they advance may
have more in common with behaviorism than they might like to admit.
Skinner criticized the practice in psychology of positing unobservable var-
iables as intervening between two observable entities in a causal chain. He
argued that if there is a regular relationship between observable and unob-
servable variables, then there is also a regular relationship between the ob-
servable variables alone; thus, the unobservable variable is causally super-
ﬂuous. Indeed, it was this claim of Skinner’s that led Hempel to articulate
the theoretician’s dilemma (see Hempel 1958, 49). Thus, the logical prob-
lem constitutes a sort of second-order behaviorism—behaviorism not with
respect to our scientiﬁc understanding of agents, but with respect to non-
human animals’ understanding of other agents. Neither form of behavior-
ism, I believe, will help us develop an empirically informed account of an-
imal psychology.
REFERENCESAndrews, Kristin. 2005. “Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?” Mind
and Language 20 (5): 521–36.
———. 2012. Review ofMindreading Animals: The Debate over What Animals Know about OtherAnd
Bräu
Buck
Call
Call
Call
Call
FletcMinds, by Robert W. Lurz. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
rews, Kristin, and Brian Huss. 2014. “Anthropomorphism, Anthropectomy, and the Null
Hypothesis.” Biology and Philosophy 29:711–29.
er, Juliane, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello. 2007. “Chimpanzees Really Know What
Others Can See in a Competitive Situation.” Animal Cognition 10:439–48.
ner, Cameron. 2014. “The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mind-Reading.”
Mind and Language 29 (5): 566–89.
, Josep. 2001. “Chimpanzee Social Cognition.” TRENDS in Cognitive Science 5 (9): 388–93.
, Josep, Brian Hare, and Michael Tomasello. 1998. “Chimpanzee Gaze Following in an Object-
Choice Task.” Animal Cognition 1 (2): 89–99.
, Josep, and Michael Tomasello. 2008. “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?
30 Years Later.” TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 12 (5): 187–92.
ender, Craig, and Jonathan Cohen. 2006. “There Is No Special Problem about Scientiﬁc
Representation.” Theoria 55:7–25.
her, Logan, and Peter Carruthers. 2013. “Behavior-Reading versus Mentalizing in Animals.”
In Agency and Joint Attention, ed. Janet Metcalfe and Herbert S. Terrace, 82–99. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Mon, 2 Nov 2015 12:12:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Gallagher, Shaun, and Daniel J. Povinelli. 2012. “Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of
Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and Adults.” Review of Philosophy and Psy-
Hare
Hare
Hare
Hem
Hey
Hop
Host
Host
Hurl
Kam
——
Leav
Leav
Lieb
Lurz
——
Lurz
Meli
Mill
Nich
Penn
MINDREADING IN NONHUMAN ANIMALS 489chology 3:145–69.
, Brian, Josep Call, Bryan Agnetta, and Michael Tomasello. 2000. “Chimpanzees Know What
Conspeciﬁcs Do and Do Not See.” Animal Behaviour 59:771–85.
, Brian, Josep Call, andMichael Tomasello. 2001. “Do Chimpanzees KnowWhat Conspeciﬁcs
Know?” Animal Behaviour 61:139–51.
, Brian, and Michael Tomasello. 2006. “Chimpanzees Deceive a Human by Hiding.” Cogni-
tion 101 (3): 495–514.
pel, Carl G. 1958. “The Theoretician’s Dilemma: A Study in the Logic of Theory Construc-
tion.” In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven,
and Grover Maxwell, 37–98. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
es, Cecilia. 1998. “Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences
21:101–48.
kins, William, Jared P. Taglialatela, and David A. Leavens. 2007. “Chimpanzees Differentially
Produce Novel Vocalizations to Capture the Attention of a Human.” Animal Behaviour 73 (2):
281–86.
etter, Autumn B., Monica Cantero, and William D. Hopkins. 2001. “Differential Use of Vocal
andGestural Communication byChimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in Response to the Attentional
Status of a Human (Homo sapiens).” Journal of Comparative Psychology 115 (4): 337–43.
etter, Autumn B., Jamie L. Russell, Hani Freeman, and William D. Hopkins. 2007. “Now You
See Me, Now You Don’t: Evidence That Chimpanzees Understand the Role of the Eyes in
Attention.” Animal Cognition 10 (1): 55–62.
ey, Susan, and Matthew Nudds. 2006. “The Question of Animal Rationality: Theory and Evi-
dence.” In Rational Animals?, ed. Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds, 1–83. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
inski, Juliane, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello. 2004. “Body Orientation and Face Ori-
entation: Two Factors Controlling Apes’ Begging Behavior from Humans.” Animal Cognition
7:216–23.
—. 2008. “Chimpanzees Know What Others Know, but Not What They Believe.” Cognition
109:224–34.
ens, David A., Autumn B. Hostetter, Michael J. Wesley, and William D. Hopkins. 2004.
“Tactical Use of Unimodal and Bimodal Communication by Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes.”
Animal Behaviour 67:467–76.
ens, David A., Jamie L. Russell, and William D. Hopkins. 2010. “Multimodal Communica-
tion by Captive Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).” Animal Cognition 13 (1): 33–40.
al, Katja, Simone Pika, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello. 2004. “To Move or Not to
Move: HowApesAdjust to theAttentional State of Others.” Interaction Studies 5 (2): 199–219.
, Robert. 2009. “If Chimpanzees Are Mindreaders, Could Behavioral Science Tell? Toward a
Solution to the Logical Problem.” Philosophical Psychology 22 (3): 305–28.
—. 2011. Mindreading Animals: The Debate over What Animals Know about Other Minds.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
, Robert W., and Carla Krachun. 2011. “How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates
Understand Others’ Internal Goals and Intentions? Solving Povinelli’s Problem.” Review of
Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3): 449–81.
s, Alicia P., Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello. 2006. “Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
Conceal Visual and Auditory Information from Others.” Journal of Comparative Psychology
120 (2): 154–62.
, John Stuart. 1872/2006. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 7, A System of Logic,
Ratiocinative and Inductive, ed. John M. Robson. Repr. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
ols, Shaun, and Stephen P. Stich. 2003.Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-
Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
, Derek C. 2011. “How Folk Psychology Ruined Comparative Psychology and What Scrub
Jays Can Do about It.” In Animal Thinking: Contemporary Issues in Comparative Cognition,
ed. Randolf Menzel and Julia Fischer, 253–65. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Mon, 2 Nov 2015 12:12:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Penn, Derek C., Keith J. Holyoak, and Daniel J. Povinelli. 2008. “Darwin’s Mistake: Explaining the
Discontinuity between Human and Nonhuman Minds.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):
Penn
——
——
Pern
Poss
Povi
Povi
——
Prem
Tem
Tom
Tom
Tom
Vonk
Whi
——
——
Whi
490 MARTA HALINA109–78.
, Derek C., and Daniel J. Povinelli. 2007. “On the Lack of Evidence That Chimpanzees
Possess Anything Remotely Resembling a ‘Theory of Mind.’ ” Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society B 362:731–44.
—. 2009. “On Becoming Approximately Rational: The Relational Reinterpretation Hypoth-
esis.” In Rational Animals, Irrational Humans, ed. Shigeru Watanabe, Aaron P. Blaisdell,
Ludwig Huber, and Allan Young, 23–44. Tokyo: Keio University Press.
—. 2013. “The Comparative Delusion: Beyond Behavioristic and Mentalistic Explanations
for Nonhuman Social Cognition.” In Agency and Joint Attention, ed. Janet Metcalfe and Her-
bert S. Terrace, 62–81. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
er, Josef. 1991. Understanding the Representational Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
, Sarah R., Chris Kuhar, Tara S. Stoinski, and William D. Hopkins. 2006. “Differential Use of
Attentional and Visual Communicative Signaling by Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and Go-
rillas (Gorilla gorilla) in Response to the Attentional Status of a Human.” American Journal of
Primatology 68 (10): 978–92.
nelli, Daniel J., and Timothy J. Eddy. 1996. “What Young Chimpanzees Know about See-
ing.” Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 61 (3): 1–152.
nelli, Daniel J., and Jennifer Vonk. 2003. “ChimpanzeeMinds: SuspiciouslyHuman?”TRENDS
in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4): 157–60.
—. 2004. “We Don’t Need a Microscope to Explore the Chimpanzee’s Mind.” Mind and
Language 19 (1): 1–28.
ack, David, and Guy Woodruff. 1978. “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?”
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4): 515–26.
pelmann, Sebastian, Juliane Kaminski, and Katja Liebal. 2011. “Focus on the Essential: All
Great Apes Know When Others Are Being Attentive.” Animal Cognition 14 (3): 433–39.
asello, Michael, and Josep Call. 2006. “Do Chimpanzees Know What Others See—or Only
What They Are Looking At?” In Rational Animals?, ed. Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds,
371–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
asello, Michael, Josep Call, and Brian Hare. 2003. “Chimpanzees Understand Psychological
States—the Question Is Which Ones and to What Extent.” TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 7
(4): 153–56.
asello, Michael, Brian Hare, and Bryan Agnetta. 1999. “Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, Follow
Gaze Direction Geometrically.” Animal Behaviour 58:769–77.
, Jennifer, and Daniel J. Povinelli. 2006. “Similarity and Difference in the Conceptual Sys-
tems of Primates: The Unobservability Hypothesis.” In Comparative Cognition: Experimental
Exploration of Animal Intelligence, ed. Edward A. Wasserman and Thomas R. Zentall, 363–
87. New York: Oxford University Press.
ten, Andrew. 1993. “Evolving a Theory of Mind: The Nature of Non-verbal Mentalism in
Other Primates.” In Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism, ed. Simon Baron-
Cohen, Helen Tager-Flusberg, and Donald J. Cohen, 367–96. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
—. 1996. “When Does Smart Behavior-Reading Become Mind-Reading?” In Theories of
Theories of Mind, ed. Peter Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, 277–92. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
—. 1998. “Triangulation, Intervening Variables, and Experience Projection.” Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 21:132–33.
ten, Andrew, and Thomas Suddendorf. 2001. “Meta-representation and Secondary Represen-
tation.” TRENDS in Cognitive Science 5 (9): 378.This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Mon, 2 Nov 2015 12:12:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
